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This article aims at analyzing the actual and potential cooperation between Brazil and Rus-
sia — two BRICS countries — in energy issues. Addressing energy security in global affairs and 
national strategies is quite obvious due to its centrality in shaping contemporary civilization. 
While energy is also vital for International Relations and for the foreign policy of particular 
countries, the topic remains quite underdeveloped in Brazil-Russia relations. This contradic-
tion is the main problem raised in the article. There are two main lines of explanation for that 
question. The first one implies that cooperation between Brazil and Russia is hindered due 
to poor legal foundations in the energy sector and constant government interference in the 
business environment in both nations. The second rationale states that both nations allegedly 
do not share similar interests, or even behave as competitors in each other’s or third markets, 
as they have been suppliers of energy in the global market. We shall advance the third line of 
argumentation, which contends that even if previous arguments are valid, the role of other 
players — either foreign governments or private enterprises — should not be underrated to un-
derstand possible limitations and setbacks in bilateral relations, in particular in energy matters. 
Moreover, lack of clarity and definition in energy policy and security is perhaps more convinc-
ing than constant government interference, especially in Brazil, and to a lesser extent, Russia.
Keywords: Russia, Brazil, BRICS, energy security, bilateral relations.
Introduction
In the common sense, energy plays a central role in everyday life of individuals, or-
ganizations, states, and in technological race among these actors in current civilization. 
Paradoxically, its study and theorization in the area of International Relations (IR) and 
Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) remains underdeveloped. The concept of energy security, 
which is perhaps a good starting point for students of both IR and FPA, can be understood 
not exactly as the ability of a state to internalize all its energy supplies, but as the capacity 
* The article was prepared within the marks of the research grant provided by the Russian Foundation 
for Basic Research (RFFI), Grant No. 19-014-00042 (Latin America in the New World Order: perspectivas 
and challenges).
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of an actor to control its sources, distribution mechanisms and to assure that the energy 
deliveries, either external or internal, remain stable, predictable and at a sustainable cost 
in economic, social and environmental terms [1]. 
While energy security is certainly central for every national foreign policy, in the 
case of Russia that connection is certainly quite clear and broadly explored in scholar 
and especially in media outlets. In Brazil, the issue is still underscored, despite its obvious 
importance since the oil shocks in the 1970s and the discoveries of large oil reserves in 
the 2000s. Despite the political engagement between both nations since the 2000s, and the 
relevance of energy in their foreign policies, the issue remains largely underdeveloped in 
bilateral relations. This contradiction is the main problematic raised in the article.
To address that question, this article shall briefly describe the role of energy security 
in external interaction of Russia and of Brazil in its first and second sections. The work 
will assess vulnerabilities and opportunities of each nation not only by determining if it is 
an overall exporter or importer of energy products, but also how is the composition of its 
energy matrix, if it is able to provide proper use of energy to fulfill its own consumption 
requirements (including refining in the case of oil), as well who are its main foreign part-
ners in energy trade. The third part present the current situation of energy cooperation 
between both countries in bilateral projects, whereas the fourth and last section analyzes 
their political interests in a broader sense, with particular attention to BRICS and propose 
some considerations on future developments in their interaction by taking into account 
the recent changes in Brazilian domestic scenario.
1. Energy and National energy strategy of Russia
The very idea of pursuing a long-term and objective strategy is well established in 
the Russian government. The first post-Soviet document on energy strategy, published in 
2003 and aiming towards the year 2020, has been re-issued in 2009. An upgraded version 
directed towards 2035, whose enactment is still pending, states that [the policy document] 
“shall be updated not less than once every five years” [9].
The draft version of the 2035 Energy Strategy recognizes the relevance of energy and 
fuels sector to sustain Russian economy and national security, as follows: “The role of en-
ergy industry in corresponds to one third of overall investments in fixed capital, around 
a half in federal government’s budget around, and more than a half in Russian exports (in 
terms of value). Its contribution for the GDP corresponds to 25–26  %, while not less than 
4  % of economically active population” [9].
In general terms, Russia is well positioned in energy sector. In the short and even 
medium terms, its production level is compatible to its enormous natural reserves in every 
relevant source, assuring a relatively comfortable situation of the nation in the matter. 
Despite high production levels in many segments, especially in oil and gas, the durability 
of proved reserves of non-renewable sources is roughly comparable to global averages, as 
shown in Table 1.
The relative endurance of Russian fossil sources over next decades may grant a 
smooth energy transition towards renewables, nuclear and other cleaner sources. It also 
implies that current economic structure grounded on extensive exploitation of natural 
resources may endure for additional years, if commodities’ prices and markets remain free 
of dramatic turbulences and even if new reserves are not discovered in Russian territory.
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Table 1. Russia: durability of non-renewable sources
Volume 
Unity
Proven 
reserves 
(2017)
Share of 
global 
reser-
ves,  %
Volume 
unity
Production 
(2017)
Ratio 
(Reserves: 
Production)
World 
ratio 
average
Oil 
Thousand 
million 
barrels 106.2 6.3
Thousand 
barrels 
per day 11257.3 25.8 50.2
Gas
Trillion 
cubic 
meters 35.0 18.1
Billion 
cubic 
metres 635.6 55.0 52.6
Coal 
Million 
tonnes 160364.0 15.5
Million 
tonnes 411.2 391.1 134.5
Source: [12].
However, a deeper insight exposes vulnerable points in energy sector, especially with 
respect to Russia’s interaction with foreign players. While the nation is a major supplier 
of energy, its incomes remain concentrated in oil exports, with low aggregated value and 
still mostly directly to European markets. In 2017, total oil exports accounted for roughly 
half of Russian exports in terms of value, while crude oil represented almost 60  % of that 
proportion (or more than a third of overall exports); natural gas responded for 11  % 
of total exports [10]. Oil and oil products produced in Russia are still directly mostly 
to European markets, although Chinese and other Asian markets have been increasing 
their share in Russian oil exports, especially since the crisis in the EU-Russia relations 
had started in 2013–2014 because of the events in Ukraine. In the case of natural gas, 
the picture is even more complicated: while several European politicians fear the high 
dependency of gas extracted in Russia or transported through pipelines crossing Russia 
from Central Asia and the Caucasus, Moscow has run not only the risk of relying in one 
regional player — the European Union — but also of requiring constant stability and col-
laboration of all transit countries, notably Ukraine. In late 2000s, before the implemen-
tation of Nord Stream project that connects Russian suppliers to Germany through the 
Baltic Sea, Ukrainian routes delivered about 80  % of gas extracted in Russia or drained 
from Central Asian countries [11]. 
The imposition of economic sanction by many Western nations against Moscow since 
the Ukrainian crisis in 2014 economic relations has put Russian energy industry under 
pressure. Economic ties between Russia and Western nations (particularly the European 
Union and the United States) have been severed on both directions, impelling the Russian 
government to engage with Asian countries, notably China. Still in 2014, Moscow and 
Beijing agreed upon enhancing trade activity, in which energy would play an invigorating 
role in economic relations.
A second aspect of vulnerability in Russian energy sector is the high dependence in 
one type of source, natural gas, which has been increasing in terms of importance since 
the Soviet times in detriment of oil and coal (Fig. 1). However, that fragility is not severe, 
as the nation is a net exporter of gas (although a tiny proportion of domestic consumption 
is imported from Central Asian countries [12, p. 34]), and proved national reserves are 
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large enough to sustain current level of production for the next five decades, if no reserves 
are discovered (Table 1). This advantage might provide time for government and private 
actors to readapt themselves towards renewable and more sustainable sources. Natural 
gas is generally preferred over oil due to lower economic costs and lower environmental 
implications, especially in terms of CO2 emissions.
Beyond those two quantitative vulnerabilities, there is a pervasive understanding 
not only in academic and professional circles, but also within the government that en-
ergy industry suffers a chronic problem of relative backwardness in terms of technology 
and efficiency in comparison to developed markets. The Energy Strategy to 2035 not only 
recognizes it, but also correlates such shortcoming with a depressed level of investments 
and, consequently, a lower economic performance of the sector in Russia vis-à-vis other 
nations [9]. Given the prevailing competitive logic of current global economy, Russian 
position in energy markets may become under threat due to the strengthening of tradi-
tional competitors (as US and Arab energy companies) and the emergence of big players 
(in particular in Asia, Australia and Latin America). In conjunction with market trends, 
political disputes sharpen those menaces to Russian energy industries. The imposition of 
a series of sanctions to Russian citizens and companies hampers their access to credit and 
technologies still only available in the West and directly challenges the nation’s status as an 
energy global superpower in medium and long run.
Progressive rapprochement with countries that have not been engaging in the impo-
sition of sanctions may partially reduce those vulnerabilities. Deepening relations with 
China and other East Asian countries is a strategic choice that may simultaneously reduce 
the dominance of exports towards Western ports and attract investments to revamp the 
infrastructure of extraction and distribution of particular fuels as explicitly cited in the 
Strategy [9]. Moreover, developing multifaceted ties with developing countries in Africa 
Fig. 1. Evolution of Primary Energy Consumption in Russia by source (1985–2017).
Source: [12]
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and Latin America may not only increase Russian exports, but also expand the share of 
high value-aggregated products, such as refined oil and other oil products, one of the goals 
of the Strategy towards 2035 [9].
Among other objectives of Russian energy industry, it can be also stressed: enhance-
ment of competitiveness in Russian energy industry in the global market; easing of access 
to energy for domestic consumers; decrease in energetic intensity in absolute and relative 
terms; promotion of more environment-friendly technologies in the sector; and develop-
ment of renewable sources [9].
Over the recent years, oil sector in Russia has consistently moved towards the in-
crease of aggregated-value along the chain production. After 2008, international oil price 
has shown inconsistent trends, impacting severely crude oil exporters around the world, 
including Russia. Since then, oil sector in Russia has strived to increase aggregated-value 
of oil exports, in particular fuel oil (43  % up from 2008 to 2013), while also reducing the 
amount of crude oil exported (8  % down in the same period). In terms of production, al-
though the share of oil in Russia’s energy matrix has witnessed a relative reduction, its ex-
traction increased 8  % in volume in that period, thanks to the operationalization of fields 
in Eastern Siberia and Yakutia. Refining output has expanded even more dramatically 
in 23  % over that period [9]. In line with the declared objective of reducing dependency 
in exports westwards, Russia, through its state-owned company Transneft, has complet-
ed two sections of the Eastern Siberia-Pacific Ocean pipeline (ESPO) and an additional 
branch towards the Chinese town of Daqing. In the West, the Baltic Pipeline System II 
has been implemented in order to bypass the territory of transitional countries in Eastern 
Europe, another source of vulnerability.
Despite the advances, oil industry in Russia still faces the volatility in international 
prices combined with the entry not only of new exporters, not to mention the explicit 
intention of many partners (in particular in Europe) to reduce oil imports from Russia. 
Moreover, new oil fields in Russia are being found in remote areas, inflating costs of ex-
traction and distribution. The necessity of drilling farther and deeper also requires the 
development of certain techniques still not in possession of Russian companies.
From 2010 to 2016, natural gas output in Russia underwent some oscillations, and in 
2017 it expanded considerably. As in case of oil sector, the extraction of natural gas has 
been sustained through the establishment of new extraction fields, mainly in the Arc-
tic and Sub-Arctic regions. In case of gas, the relevance of Europe for Russia has been 
much more acute than in oil exports, deepening the mutual dependence and vulnerability 
between both partners. Despite the attempts of reducing mutual vulnerability, Russia’s 
relevance for European Union members has maintained or even increased amid politi-
cal turbulence since 2014 in case of gas, oil and coal (Table 2). The completion of Nord 
Stream-2, connecting Russia to Germany through the Baltic Sea, shall increase those fig-
ures and further reducing the bargaining power of in-between countries. 
While the deliveries for some countries such as Ukraine have receded seriously, the 
promise of inauguration and exploitation of new routes eastwards, particularly to China 
and other Asian countries1 may not only increase dividends of exports in the sector, but 
also augment Russia’s leverage in determining the price of the fuel.
1 Sila Sibiri (The Power of Siberia), a gas pipeline connecting Yakutia fields to Vladivostok, with a 
direct branch into China, shall be inaugurated in 2019; Sakhalin-Vladivostok gas pipeline has been explored 
since 2011.
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2. Energy and National energy strategy of Brazil
Although Brazilian energy industry has been long appraised due to the high share of 
renewables in its matrix, there is a difficulty to create a consensus towards a clear long-
term national strategy, in opposition to the Russian case [2]. Domestic disputes over basic 
questions, which persisted during most of the 20th century and has prolonged into the 
beginning of the next century, has partially shaped the current energy policy. Further-
more, some opinions doubt about the very possibility of implementing a cohesive and 
logic strategy in a part of the world where US influence has been hegemonic and averse 
either to local autonomous powers or to interference of both China and Russia [8].
It is much harder to identify a clear and long-standing strategy for the Brazilian en-
ergy industry, although it is possible to point out some continuities since at least the mid-
20th century. Perhaps the quest for energetic autonomy (in terms of supply) is a recurring 
pattern over decades. External shocks in the supply of energy, especially in oil trade, was 
part of the reasoning for reducing dependency from foreign deliveries; the memory of fuel 
shortage in the country during the Second World War lay the basis for enacting policies to 
protect national energy industry. 
Autonomy was conceived not only as the maximization of internal supply of energy, 
but also the control over production and distribution processes by the government. The 
foundation of major state-owned companies in the sector proves that assumption: Petro-
bras (oil industry, created in 1953), Eletrobras (electricity, founded in 1962); several fed-
erative states also followed suit and created local energy entities.2
However, the focus on autonomy waned over the following decades. Although suc-
cessive administrations worked to enhance domestic capabilities, in particular through 
hydropower, oil demand expanded quite rapidly due to prioritization of road system 
and popularization of automobile industry in detriment of other modes of transporta-
tion systems. In mid-1970s, 45  % of energy consumed in Brazil was provided by imports 
[14]. Meanwhile, electricity was being produced mostly through hydropower, making the 
source responsible for three-quarters of consumed electricity in the country. Despite such 
an over-reliance on one single source, the policy was calculated due to extensive avail-
ability of Brazilian rivers, low costs of implementation and the relatively low impact on 
environment when compared to other resources [2].
Sudden rise in international price in 1973 and even more acutely in 1979 appalled 
government officials due to the high level of vulnerability of national energy security to 
external events. Many policies intended to restore autonomy by reducing oil imports in 
domestic consumption, increasing the share of alternative sources available in the country 
(hydroelectricity, biomass and ethanol) (Fig. 2), and enhancing national oil production 
(Fig. 3). The increase in domestic supply was possible thanks to partnerships between 
Petrobras and Brazilian universities and research institutes, which eventually developed 
new technologies that allowed extracting oil in deep-water fields in the Atlantic, already 
in the 1970s.
2 For instance, Eletropaulo (energy delivery) and Companhia Energética de São Paulo (energy gen-
eration), in São Paulo state; Companhia Energética de Minas Gerais (CEMIG), Minas Gerais state; Com-
panhia Estadual de Energia Elétrica (CEEE) in Rio Grande do Sul state, among others. Most state-level 
companies though were put under private control in the 1990s.
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It is possible to infer that, for many years, vulnerability has been conceived largely in 
terms of how much of domestic consumption depended on direct energy imports. However, 
as observed in Russian case, energy security also involves other relevant variables and is 
constantly subject to new categories and definitions. In addition to this point, depending on 
foreign exports is not exactly a problem when the supply chain is under an international in-
Fig. 2. Evolution of Primary Energy Consumption in Brazil by source (1985–2017). Source: [12]
Fig. 3. Production and Consumption of oil in Brazil (1965–2017). Source: [12]
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tegration framework3. The importer nation may exert implicit or direct control over abroad 
reserves4. Beyond direct dependence of external ‘independent’ deliveries, strategic vulner-
ability also encompasses proven reserves-production ratio (or ‘life expectancy of reserves’), 
ecological damage to population, innovation inputs in the sector, technological control over 
energy processes, and also cost-benefit of resources, among other factors.
Although Brazil has managed to reduce significantly oil imports after 1970, while 
also promoting diversification of its matrix, two important shortcomings became more 
and more apparent over the following decades. Firstly, the country did not saw an upsurge 
in the discovery of new reserves of oil until the 1990s, thus ‘depleting’ the existing ones 
and leading reserves-to-production ratio to a threatening level although the discovery of 
reserves in the offshore pre-salt layer managed to partially reverse the trend (Fig. 4). In 
order to secure proper supply, the company also strived to establish and diversify partner-
ships with oil-exporting countries from different regions, such as Libya, Iraq, Angola and 
Venezuela. The exploitation of pre-salt layer in the 2010s also reduced the demand on 
crude oil imports.
Due to destabilization in many supplying nations5 and poor economic performance of 
Brazil in the 1990s, many investments were curtailed and the company was partially privat-
ized. During neoliberal presidencies of Fernando Collor de Melo (1990–1992) and Fernan-
do Henrique Cardoso (1995–2002) autonomy was abdicated in favor of opening the energy 
3 For example, US dependence on Canadian oil is not a serious problem for the former once both na-
tions are highly integrated in economic, social and political domains).
4 The United Kingdom (and after the US) used to rely on vast oil resources of Persia due to the heavy 
influence over the Asian nation, what can be considered as a clear an example of political (and military) 
control of foreign energy resources. 
5 Brazil used to have a solid partnership with Iraq. The Arabic nation was not only the major oil sup-
plier to Brazil, but also a big purchaser of Brazilian manufactured goods until the Gulf Crisis in 1990.
Fig. 4. Reserves to production ratio in Brazil. Source: [15]
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sector to private and foreign entities, especially the generation of electricity. The move was 
expected to increase energy supply, to promote economic competitiveness in the sector, in-
duce more efficiency and attract foreign capital capable of promoting local infrastructure 
and bringing new technologies. The restructuring involved deregulation of the sector, the 
end of Petrobras monopoly in many oil-related activities, and the creation of monitoring 
agencies. However, the results were much meager than expected, as investments were not 
sufficient to avoid a major collapse of Brazilian electricity system in 2001 [14].
By that time, reviewing the national energy strategy started to be demanded by many 
specialists and the public opinion. The election of Lula da Silva in 2002, himself critic of pro-
privatization stance in the 1990s, was the culmination of that movement. Although his ad-
ministrations did not restore the pure autonomist trend of the military dictatorship (1964–
1985), Da Silva sought to strengthen national capabilities in certain sectors, especially in oil 
sector. The solid elevation in oil prices in the 2000s allowed Petrobras not only to increase its 
revenues, but also to perform investments in new oil fields and refining capacity, leading to 
the balancing between production and consumption in the next decade. Also, the govern-
ment acted to reduce over-reliance on hydroelectricity by installing thermoelectric plants 
in every region, even though the former remained, by far, as the main source of electricity. 
Over the last few decades, boosting regional energy integration has been a common 
ground pursued by successive federal administrations, despite their divergences in politi-
cal orientation. Therefore, insistence in enhancing domestic self-reliance has been rela-
tivized in favor of deepening ties with neighboring countries, while also not completely 
relinquishing trade with other countries, particularly in North America and the Middle 
East. Still during last period of authoritarian regime, Brazilian government financed and 
built Itaipu Hydropower, the most powerful plant at time, in the border with Paraguay 
on Parana River. In 1997, a gas pipeline connecting extracting areas in Bolivia to major 
Center-South Brazilian metropolises was inaugurated. In 2017, natural gas, which was the 
third more relevant source in energy matrix, was partially provided from Bolivia (roughly 
25  %), while the remaining was obtained from domestic reserves.
Although energy was an obvious central topic for Brazilian administrations, not until 
2007 the nation managed to publish an official report on the industry aimed at planifica-
tion. The National Plan of Energy, just as Russia’s Strategy, analyzes the situation in each 
source, forecasts scenarios towards 2030 and proposes strategies to cope with vulnerabili-
ties and weaknesses in that realm. The scope of the plan is wider and more detailed than its 
Russian counterpart: it not only reiterates objectives and policies and strategies for energy 
industry, but also foresees different scenarios of economic and demographic growth, to 
which given energy strategy shall respond.In the same context, Empresa de Pesquisa En-
ergética (EPE) was created in order assist the government, including planning assessment, 
provision of data and statistics, elaboration of relevant analysis in all energy segments, 
including economic, environmental and social costs [21].The institution, together with 
Ministry of Mining and Energy (MME), was directly involved in designing the 2030 En-
ergy Plan, and has been committed to deliver an updated version, the 2050 Energy Plan, 
beyond the making of other regular reports on the sector.6
One major objective of National Plan towards 2030 is to promote diversification 
in energy matrix, reducing the role of oil and its products, while increasing the share 
6 For instance, the Energetic Outlook and the Statistical Yearbook, both issued in a yearly basis.
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of renewables, uranium and even some fossil sources (gas and coal), but the use of 
renewables were expected to increase in relative terms, though fossil fuels shall prevail 
(53,4  %) in 2030. Domestic sources are expected to continue supplying around 90  % 
of energy requirements. Energy intensity by GDP unit ought to be reduced in 5  % over 
the period.
In current energy matrix, oil has been the most important energy source and shall 
maintain that prevalence over the next decades, according to 2030 National Energy Plan. 
While oil sector has managed to reduce foreign reliance since the 1970s by enhancing 
domestic production, it is also true that fostering the consumption of alternative fuels, 
namely ethanol and biodiesel more recently also contributed in that direction. In mid-
2010s, the nation has become a net exporter of oil, thanks not only to the maturing of in-
frastructure investments, but also due to a severe economic depression between 2015 and 
2016. Due to technical aspects, Brazil imported 8,1  % of oil processed in its refineries 
in 2017 [16]; almost half of imported volume is originated from Saudi Arabia (50,6  %), 
followed by Algeria (23  %) [15, p. 10], what implies an accentuated vulnerability due not 
only to geographic concentration, but also to heavy reliance on trade routes prone to geo-
political and security issues, such as piracy in Indic Ocean, chronic conflicts on African 
and Yemeni shores of Aden Sea, and possible military confrontation around Ormuz Strait 
between Saudi Arabia and Iran.
While the country is a net exporter of crude oil, the same cannot be applied to refined 
oil, which is a chronic trouble for Brazilian policymakers. The adoption of a pro-market 
approach since 2015 due to recession and corruption scandals has further aggravated the 
problem. In 2013, utilization factor of Brazilian refineries peaked 97  %; in 2017, the fig-
ured decreased to 76  % [12]. To compensate declining domestic production, Brazil has 
increased imports of oil products. From 2016 to 2017, imports soared 30  % in volume [12, 
p. 14]; while more than half of imported amount originated from the US, implying vulner-
ability in terms of predominant supplier.
A major obstacle in Brazilian energy sector is the inconsistency in policy planning 
and implementation. The case of Petrobras along the 2010s illustrate the problem: while 
its Business Plan in 2014 envisaged to reach daily production of 4.2 million barrels by 
2020, the 2015 Plan curbed that figure to only 2.8 million barrels per day, while also fore-
seeing sharp cuts in investments and sales of assets [3]. The same can be applied to other 
resources. Nuclear energy, which has been under consideration among Brazilian authori-
ties even before the military regime due to the availability of uranium in the country, wit-
nessed a major advance in 1970s with the construction of two plants near Rio de Janeiro 
(Angra 1 and 2). Economic turbulence, budget shortcomings and the abrupt policy reori-
entation in 1990 delayed the completion of Angra-2 to 2001 and have postponed several 
times the inauguration of Angra-3. There have been projects on wind and solar energy, 
but their high cost and lack of interest in Jair Bolsonaro’s administration may difficult their 
implantation over the territory in the future.
3. Energy agenda in bilateral relations between Brazil and Russia
Brazil was never the key economic partner for the Soviet Union; Argentina and Com-
munist Cuba hold the pole positions in terms of trade with the USSR. Trade links were 
established in 1959 after an official Brazilian mission paid visit to Moscow and negotiated 
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the commercialization of Soviet oil in change of Brazilian agricultural products7, even 
before the restoration of diplomatic relations in 1961 [4]. 
In the 1970s, energy cooperation became also technological, with the provision of 
Soviet-made turbines for Sobradinho hydroelectric plant in Bahia state through compen-
sation system, as trade balance always favored the Brazilian side. Brazilian major contrac-
tor Odebrecht and Soviet Technopromeksport also gathered to develop and build hydro-
electric plant of Capanda, in Angola [4].
The fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, and the political and economic instabilities in 
Brazil and in the new Russia along the 1990s postponed or stalled several projects. Neolib-
eral reforms targeted inflation control diminution of primary deficits in both nations, but 
also foresaw budget cuts for implementing new projects and standstill in enhancing energy 
capabilities. Even oil crude trade was severely hit by Brazilian reduced demand8,whereas 
the scrapped infrastructure of the oil sector also affected Russian exports. Moreover, lack of 
reciprocal interest between Brazilian and Russian hindered a serious breakthrough in every 
single aspect of bilateral dialogue, including energy talks, especially under Collor de Melo 
presidency (1990–1992) and Andrey Kozyrev’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1992–1996) [5].
The main advance was the establishment in 1997  of the High-Level Commission, 
which is chaired by the Russian Prime-Minister and the Brazilian Vice-President, with the 
purpose of discussing basic provisions of bilateral relations, and also the Intergovernmen-
tal Commission for Cooperation, which addresses specific cooperation projects. Despite 
the progress in framework, talks halt due to the financial crisis in Russia, which led to a 
spiral of political instability9. Brazil was also hit by a major currency devaluation in 1999, 
harming nation’s ability to sustain international economic deals. Another significant fact 
was the 1994 agreement on the pacific uses of nuclear energy, which stipulated topics and 
means of cooperation, as well as the national executive agencies, Rosatom (Russia) and 
National Commission for Nuclear Energy (Brazil), but due to the aforementioned prob-
lems, the cooperation remained mostly on paper.
An interesting characteristic of the 2000s was the process of familiarization between 
representatives of both nations. In several occasions, negotiators did share many points 
of view on principles of cooperation and the desirability of a balanced and mutually ben-
eficial partnership, but disagreed on how to give concrete steps to execute the projects. 
While there was interest to promote cooperation, including in energy questions, Russian 
representatives expected primarily to commercialize their technologic portfolio to their 
Brazilian counterparts, who were eager to develop joint horizontal partnerships in devel-
opment, production and technology-sharing [5]. 
Nuclear technicians from both nations were able to discuss and even to propose some 
projects in several rounds of negotiation. In the opinion of Brazilian diplomats, the main 
reason for poor results lay on the fragilities in Brazilian nuclear program, and not in di-
vergent views between both sides. President Cardoso’s trip to Russia in early 2002 was 
7 In 1947, two years after officially recognizing the Soviet Union, Brazilian government unilaterally 
broke its ties with Moscow after a minor incident involving a criticism on Brazil in an issue of Literaturnaya 
Gazeta published in the USSR.
8 In this case, not only due economic difficulties, but also to the decision of reducing foreign oil im-
ports in favor of domestic production, as seen in the previous section.
9 Only in 1998 and 1999, five different individuals were nominated as Prime Minister of Russia.
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remarkable to its political outcomes10, but did not improve bilateral collaboration in eco-
nomic and technology domains in a meaningful fashion [5].
In 2004, for the first time representatives of Brazilian Petrobras and Russian Gazprom, 
met to prospect possibilities of cooperation, including Russian participation in Petrobras’ 
tenders, joint activity in third countries, co-development of technologies, among other as-
pects. Diplomats recognized the possibility of mutual gains in technological transfer, given 
Petrobras’ expertise in deep-water exploration and extraction, and Gazprom’s know-how 
in natural gas extraction and delivery. The project of constructing a gas pipeline connect-
ing extraction fields in Venezuela and Bolivia to major consuming areas in Southeastern 
Brazil and in Argentina drew attention not only of Gazprom, but also of Surgutneftegaz 
and Lukoil. Gazprom and Petrobras also signed a memorandum of understanding in 
2007  that provided for cooperation in building gas and oil pipelines, joint-ventures in 
refining and natural gas liquefaction activities.
Political and economic divergences in goals, although not unsurmountable, did de-
lay the fructification of bilateral projects. Brazilian officials stressed joint and mutually 
profitable development of technologies and processes, while the Russian side was keen 
at trading its techniques [5]. Regarding commercial operations, conflicting interests also 
were visible: while the Brazilians glimpsed the idea of expanding exports of biofuels at that 
time, the Russians perceived that fuel as a potential rival of crude oil and gas in global and 
domestic markets [5].
After an acquainting phase, the discovery of huge oil reserves in Brazilian pre-salt lay-
er in late 2000s, Brazil has drew increasing attention from foreign players keen on entering 
the major Latin American market and, possibly, the biggest oil reserves in the region after 
Venezuela. Russian hydrocarbon enterprises have sought to assure a position in Brazil, 
making them as the main vector of Russian investments in Brazil.
At least four Russian companies (both private and state-owned ones) maintain or 
maintained a noticeable presence in the South American country: NK Rosneft, Lukoil, 
Gazprom and Neftegazgeodeziya. Among them, Rosneft has even established a local 
branch and, more importantly, has developed a significant project of oil extraction in 
Solimões Basin (Amazonas state) since 2013; in 2015, it has been the sole operator in the 
activity, by purchasing rights of local firms [19].
The Power Machines (“Silovye Machiny”) concern has exported turbines to Brazil 
since the 1970s. In that decade, the Soviet equipment was exported for the hydropower 
plants of Capivara (São Paulo state) and Sobradinho (Bahia state). In the post-Soviet pe-
riod, Power Machines has supplied equipment for the hydropower plants of Porto Góes 
(São Paulo state) and Passo São João (Rio Grande do Sul state). In 2010 the Russian corpo-
ration opened an office in São Paulo. In 2015, seeing the Latin American markets as prom-
ising, Power Machines acquired a fifty one per cent stake in Fezer, a Brazilian company 
based in the state of Santa Catarina and specialized in woodworking machinery as well 
as hydro turbine components [16]. Another Russian corporation, Energomashexport, has 
installed and launched two generators at Nova Aurora and two generators at Goiandira 
hydro power plants, both located in Goiás state [17].
10 During the viusit, Brazil expressed its support for Russian entry into the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO), while Moscow welcomed Brasilia’s bid as a permanent member of the United Nations Security 
Council. 
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Besides the provision of hydropower plant equipment, the bilateral relations in the en-
ergy sector are still far from reaching the expectations of both countries. In 2007, Gazprom 
and Stroytransgaz signed memorandums of mutual understanding with Brazilian Petro-
bras on exploration, production, transportation and commercialization of hydrocarbons. 
In 2011, Gazprom opened its office in Rio de Janeiro [18]. The construction of a transcon-
tinental gas pipeline was discussed, but the project did not advance. After many years of 
contacts between Petrobras and Russian oil and gas corporations, Rosneft was finally able to 
start oil exploration in Brazil. This move was made possible because of growing cooperation 
between Rosneft and Petrobras. The promising Solimões project in the Amazon covers ap-
proximately 41.500 sq. km (16 license blocks). According to Rosneft, the project “establishes 
Rosneft in Brazil, a country with major upstream growth opportunities and synergies with 
Rosneft operations in Venezuela” [20]. This achievement, combined with the presence of 
Petrobras in Russia, might herald a new stage in the development of partnership. However, 
the favorable business climate was soon overcast by the corruption crisis in Brazil as well as 
economic and financial difficulties in Russia.
However, the volume of Russian investments in Brazilian energy sector remains very 
tiny if compared to other relevant players, such as the Americans, Chinese and other 
Europeans.
4. The Brazilian-Russian energy dialogue in a broader view: 
the role of BRICS, interests and prospects
Despite being net exporters of energy, especially when it comes to oil sector, Brazil 
and Russia do share a myriad of interests and may potentially enter into agreement on 
substantial issues. Sustaining international oil prices that at the same time surpass their 
own production costs and do not cause major damage to domestic prices of fuel suits their 
interests in relation to other players. This common objective is at odds with the interests 
of Saudi Arabian and other Gulf monarchies, which may endure much lower production 
costs, and of the United States, which has been developing unconventional forms of oil 
extraction, such as fracking. This has led to a boost in global supply of energy and has de-
cisively impacted the formation of prices at the world level [6]. Moreover, Brazil and Rus-
sia do not directly compete in oil market: their exports target distinct regions, as Brazilian 
oil is sold to China, the United States, Chile, India and Spain, while Russia’s production is 
sold mostly to European markets and China.
Global governance for energy is considerably underdeveloped if compared to other 
relevant issues. If direct interaction in specific projects between Brazilians and Russians 
has been remarkable since the Cold War, only since the 2000s officials from both nations 
have been raising and discussing relevant topics that may affect global energy security, 
both in bilateral meetings and in multilateral forums, notably in BRICS and, to a lesser ex-
tent, G20. Diplomats from both nations converge in basic principles of cooperation, such 
as the necessity of respecting national interests without meddling in the domestic affairs 
of other nations, the primacy of compromise solutions and the strengthening of multilat-
eral mechanisms of decision (particularly the United Nations and its specialized agencies) 
under strict observance of International Law [7].
The idea of reducing foreign dependence of energy resources is seen in both na-
tions not only under the superficial lenses of production and foreign trade, but also in 
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terms of internalizing technologies that provide energy generation and delivery within 
their national boundaries at competitive prices. Also, they share the concept that energy 
should be object of their respective regional integration schemes; neighboring coun-
tries’ output may serve as compliment to domestic supply and vice-versa. Transnational 
infrastructure is significantly much more developed in Eurasian area thanks to common 
Soviet past, although intra-South American links have been encouraged since the 1990s. 
Moreover, Russian enterprises tend to be more open to discuss potential technological 
transfer deals than their Western counterparts, what suits the Brazilian negotiators. 
However, Brasilia and Moscow do differ on some substantial issues. Even though 
Russians and Brazilians are interested in increasing energy efficiency and reducing over-
dependency on one sole resource, the former tend to perceive energy security as stability 
in global markets, taking into consideration the interests of producers, consumers and 
transit countries [7], while the latter are more sensible to climate change issues and, there-
fore, eager to promote environment-friendly solutions.
Prospects of cooperation have been long stressed in treaties, official statements and 
political speeches of both nations’ high-ranked authorities. Perhaps one central issue 
is nuclear energy, which has been under increasing attention of Brazilians authorities, 
after a brief but harsh period of unpredictability. The topic, which was discussed in 
successive occasions by Brazilian and Russian diplomats, is expected to return to the 
bilateral agenda over the next years. Technological collaboration in fossil fuels’ explo-
ration remains potential to be advanced, as soon as Brazilian investments in the sec-
tor resume after the mid-2010s economic recession. Due to their similar costs level of 
production, they also may devote some effort on stabilization (and even regulation) of 
oil global market by interacting with Organization of Petroleum Exporters Countries 
(OPEC), other non-OPEC countries, major transnational oil companies, and even op-
posing these players’ activities.
Among other possible paths for cooperation rest on inter-companies co-work in 
third countries, inducement of higher aggregated-value in bilateral trade, stabilization of 
international trade routes and the establishment of an inclusive and fair global governance 
on energy.
The emergence of BRICS in the 2000s provided with a new room for debating po-
litical perspectives but also for envisaging potential projects, including in energy-related 
questions. Although the achievements of the group were quite meager and too specific 
over its first ten years of existence, it is true that the image of Brazil in Russia (and vice-
versa) has been highlighted, what may explain the surge of Russian investments in the 
Brazilian economy. 
However, energy is yet highly underestimated in BRICS not due to perceived con-
tradictory interests of its participating nations, but to the difficulty to tackle the issue in 
a global and holistic perspective. Although there are some institutions that address en-
ergy questions in a broader sense, they fail either in terms of global representativeness (as 
the case of International Energy Agency, which acts as a branch of Western-dominated 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) or scope (such as the Inter-
national Renewable Energy Agency, which count with genuine global representation, but 
its sector focus remains limited to regulation of alternative sources). 
BRICS nations do engage in energy issues, but they prefer proceeding it in a bilateral 
or intra-regional basis. Beyond the burgeoning contracts being promoted between Russia 
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and China since 2014 in oil and gas sector and, to a lesser extent, Russia and India in the 
joint-ventures in gas industry in the Sakhalin, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization 
(SCO), which encompasses the three counties, has been active on promoting energy de-
bates, including the ‘Energy Club’ [16].
In a contextual prism, Brazilian-Russian projects unfolded the densification of dip-
lomatic and trade interaction since mid-2000s. Many topics discussed especially during 
Inácio da Silva’s second term (2007–2010) matured and produced effects during Rouss-
eff ’s first term (2011–2014). The political and economic turmoil in the South American 
country after 2015 did effect the evolvement of government-led projects, but did not 
jeopardize the activities of Russian businesses in Brazilian soil, as seen in the previous 
section. The level of bilateral relations will depend not only on the prevalent political 
will within the new elect president, but also the ability of Jair Bolsonaro’s administration 
(entered in office since January, 2019) in overcoming economic crisis which affected 
many projects, including in energy sector.
Even though the first declarations indicated that the new president will strive to 
improve relations with the United States and review the relationship with pertinent part-
ners, especially China, it is still very unclear the role of Russia on the Brazilian foreign 
policy radar. Due to budgetary cuts, strived domestic policy and uncertainness within 
the formulation of foreign policy, links with Russia and other emerging powers (espe-
cially in Eurasia) may wane, thus restoring Fernando Collor de Mello’s and Henrique 
Cardoso’s agendas too focused in primary trade, rather than promotion of innovative 
forms of cooperation.
Concluding remarks
In a pure quantitative and superficial analysis, Brazil and Russia share many broad 
similarities on energy issues that would put them more as competitors than friends: both 
are net exports of fossil fuels while geographic distance would further inhibit economic 
interaction. However, a deeper investigation suggests exactly an opposite conclusion.
Even in oil sector, stabilizing global oil prices and securing international trade 
routes is generally desired among both nations’ governments and companies, what shall 
be addressed in multilateral forums, including BRICS and the United Nations. There is 
even room for mutually benefic cooperation between major petrol giants Petrobras and 
Rosneft, given their performance in certain domains such as deep-water exploration 
and refining. They are also wary of competition of other lower-cost producers in the 
Persian Gulf and the emergence of non-traditional forms of extraction, such as fracking 
in North America. Complementarity is much more apparent due to their expertise in 
distinct energy sources.
Uncertainties and inconsistencies in policy planning and implementation, though, 
is a major hindrance for a successful interaction not only between Brazil and Russia, but 
for their own strategies of ensuing energy security at home and of projecting power and 
influence overseas, especially in the case of Brazil.
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